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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

JUL 2 1981

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OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

June 19, 1981

The Honorable  
Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense

Dear Cap,

I enclose a copy of a memorandum about my conversation yesterday with Eppie Evron. On getting back I checked over the file, and found it very disturbing indeed. If you haven't reviewed it yourself since the Israeli strike I recommend that you do so. It is a time bomb.

Yours sincerely,

*Gene*

Enclosure:

Memcon/with enclosure

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20481

June 19, 1981

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Israeli Strike on Iraqi Nuclear Reactor

Participants: Israel: Ambassador Evron  
ACDA : Eugene V. Rostow

Ambassador Evron invited Rostow for lunch on June 18 to renew old ties. They had worked closely together in 1966-68, particularly on matters related to the Six Day War.

While most of the conversation dealt with personalities and styles of diplomacy in Washington and Israel these days, some matters of substance were touched upon.

First, of course, the Israeli raid on the French nuclear reactor in Iraq. Evron said that he felt the President could not have been informed about the formal talks on Iraq's nuclear program between the United States Government and Israel during the last six months of 1980, and particularly that of December 17, 1980. According to Evron, he had been called in by Assistant Secretary of State Pickering and Ambassador Lewis had called on Prime Minister Begin. The conversations were parallel and reviewed nuclear developments in Iraq as perceived by the USG. In both conversations it was explained that the USG shared Israel's serious concerns about Iraq's nuclear program; the pace and scope of the Iraqi program exceeded Iraq's apparent needs; and the US believed it was intended to give that country's government the option of developing nuclear explosives in the future. This being the case, Evron was concerned and disturbed that the USG now took a strong public position to the contrary, and that he could get no clear answer about the future of arms deliveries and arms sales.

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Rostow called attention to what Under Secretary Stoessel had said before the House Armed Services Committee the previous day (Evron thought that part of Stoessel's statement was constructive) and Rostow remarked that the background of the raid raised important questions of non-proliferation policy he intended to study carefully when the dust settles.

Second, Evron regretted the "errors and carelessness" in the Israeli presentation of evidence about public manifestations of Iraqi intentions with respect to nuclear weapons development. Saddam Hussein's public statement of June 8 was helpful in that regard. But the Israelis had now found an Iraqi newspaper report in our FBIS series which took the same view (date and source being confirmed).

Third, Evron delivered to me the attached memorandum from Ambassador Bar-On in Jerusalem.

Fourth, Evron said he would call on Rostow soon to explain Israeli ideas about a nuclear free zone in the Middle East. Rostow said he wished to be informed on this; Gideon Rafael had raised the question with him recently, and Ambassador Kirkpatrick had told him that Israeli Ambassador Blum at the UN was pressing the issue.

*End*

Attachment:

Memorandum from Ambassador Bar-On

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